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ABSTRACT
Regulations designed to constrain the capital structure and reduce
the probability of ruin of insurance firms are pervasive. These
usually are explained by the need to protect consumers who cannot moni-
tor the financial condition of insurers. A complementary rationale for
regulation is developed that focusses on the benefits of such regula-
tion to the firms' equity holders. In the absence of monitoring infor-
mation, insurers face prospective erosion of demand through adverse
selection. Regulations act as quality signals (that no "lemons" exist)
that prevent demand erosion. But equityholders also benefit when moni-
toring information is costlessly available. Regulations bond the
equityholders to avoid post contract wealth expropriations from policy-
holders. Equityholders benefit from such bonding since, in the absence
of regulation, such time inconsistent incentives would lead the insurer
to suboptimal decisions on capital structure and other financial
variables.

I. INTRODUCTION
The value of an existing insurance contract depends upon the finan-
cial ability of the insurer to make good on its promise to meet state
contingent claim payments. Regulation aimed at increasing this value
is pervasive. Most states, and indeed national jurisdictions, require
insurers not to exceed prespecified leverage ratios, i.e., the ratio
of premiums to shareholders' equity or surplus. Empirical evidence
has revealed this ratio to be associated with financial distress (cf.
Pinches and Trieschman) . Furthermore, an extensive actuarial literature
has shown that an analytic relationship exists between leverage and
the probability of ruin of the insurer.
Complementary regulation includes constraints imposed on the com-
position of the insurer's asset portfolio. The form of such regula-
tion varies considerably across jurisdictions but the general effect
is to preclude or limit investment in high risk assets. Again, the
perceived intention is to reduce the prospective loss to policyholders
should the insurer become insolvent. The final safety net comes in the
form of the insolvency guarantee systems operated by the States. Sur-
viving insurers make good outstanding payments in the event that one of
their competitors becomes insolvent. Such schemes resemble the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporate with the main difference being that most
state insurance guarantee schemes are post funded by assessments on
surviving insurers.
The rationale for such solvency regulation usually offered relates
to the difficulty faced by consumers in evaluating the financial con-
dition of insurers. Since such information is costly, the insurer may
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take actions that increase the prospective default loss faced bv con-
sumers. Such actions would not necessarily he reflected in the prices
of insurance policies. As a result, equityholders would he able to
expropriate wealth from policyholders (see Munch and Smallwood [19811;
Finsinger and Pauly [1984]). From this rationale we may suppose that,
in a world in which consumers could perfectly monitor the financial
condition of insurers, solvency regulation would be redundant. Any
increase in the prospective default loss to be borne by the consumers
would be impounded in the price of the insurance contracts, and there-
fore fall on the equityholders. Consumers may well choose risky
policies from a menu of offerings, but they would do so in full
knowledge of the ruin probability and they would pay a correspondingly
lower price. Thus the rationale for solvency regulation arises from
the perceived need to protect consumers in the event of costly infor-
mation.
The current paper enriches the rationale for solvency regulation.
We will show that insurance firms have an incentive to submit to regu-
lation. Furthermore, we will show that this incentive for self regula-
tion is present both when consumers can monitor the financial condition
of the insurance firm and when they can not. When consumers cannot
monitor the insurer's financial condition an adverse selection problem
will exist. To prevent erosion of market demand, insurers will benefit
from the collective imposition of some combination of regulatory
controls; notably guarantee funds and/or leverage constraints. But
even when consumers can monitor financial condition, insurers will face
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time inconsistent incentives. They may choose actions that expropriate
wealth from policyholders after the insurance contracts have heen writ-
ten. No doubt, consumers would anticipate such behavior and nrice it
into the insurance contract thereby reshifting costs back to equity-
holders and forcing; the firm into sub optimal financial decisions. In
this situation, solvency regulation provides a bonding mechanism, in
which insurers commit themselves to not indulge in post contract
expropriations.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND BASIC RELATIONSHIPS
The required assumptions are:
(1) Capital markets are complete and in a state of competitive
equilibrium. This permits use of the value maximization
objective.
(2) Taxes are not considered.
(3) There are no transaction costs associated with the "ruin" of
the insurance firm.
(4) There are no agency costs arising from the relationship
between the owners of the insurance firm (as principals) and
its managers (or agents).
(5) Contracts are presented in a simple single period framework
in which all cash flows arise at the beginning or end of the
contract. The firm is sold (perhaps back to its original
equityholders) at the end of the period for its terminal market
value.
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The insurer will be considered to be a leveraged financial inter-
mediary. At the beginning of each period the firm issues new equity
(or inherits equity from a previous period) and insurance policies.
The proceeds are used to construct an asset portfolio. At the end of
the period, the value of the asset portfolio is used to discharge
policyholder claims; the residual value accruing to equi tyholders.
The opening cash flow is
(1) Y
Q
= E + P - X
where E is paid in equity (or surplus in insurance terminology), P is
premium income and X is the insurer's production and marketing expen-
ses which are assumed to be incurred up front. The proceeds net of
expenses are invested. However, the firm is subject to a regulatory
constraint that in effect, forces it to invest a certain proportion c
of its opening value in assets of low risk yielding a return r . The
residual proportion (1-c) may be invested without constraint yielding
a risky return r.. Thus the terminal value of the portfolio is
(2) Y. = (E+P-X)(l+r.) - c(P-X)(r.-r )
1 1 1 c
The policyholders will receive the assessed value of losses L if
Y. is sufficiently large, otherwise they will receive Y (if positive)
leaving nothing for equi tyholders . Thus the terminal value of the
policyholders claim may be written
(3) H
:
= MIN(L,Y
1
,0)
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This payoff structure has the characteristics of a European option
and we may write its present value as
(4) HQ
= V(Y
X
) - c(Y
1
,L) E V(H
X
)
where V(
*
) is the present value operator and c(M,N) is a European call
option written on M with striking price N. In fact the striking price
here, L, is stochastic, but this should not cause great problems.
Since we ignore taxes, the residual value of the asset portfolio
accrues to equityholders. Consequently, the present value of the
equity claim is
(5) V(E) = V(Y
X
) - HQ
= c(Y
x
,L)
III. CAPITAL STRUCTU RE AND SOLVENCY REGULATION IN THE ABSENCE
OF MONITORING
Consider that consumers cannot monitor the financial condition of
the insurer. It follows that the prices consumers are willing to pay
for the policies offered by different companies are insensitive to
their respective financial conditions, and insensitive to their
respective choices of leverage. In this situation, it is easily shown
that the optimal level of equity E to be held for any given premium
income P, is zero. The assumed objective is that the insurer wishes
to maximize the value added to its equity (surplus) contribution, i.e.,
(6) Max V(E) - E
E
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Since, by assumption the capital market yields equilibrium expected
returns on financial assets, it follows that
(7) V(Y, ) =Y^=E+P-X since V(l+r.) = V(l+r ) = 110 l c
Now, dV(Y )/dE must equal unity since P is insensitive to choice of
equity by the information assumption. Any change in E will increase
the value of the equity call (equation 5), since it increases the
value of the underlying asset Y on which the call is written. But
with any nonzero probability that the option will expire worthless
(a nonzero probability of ruin) the call cannot increase by greater
2
value than the underlying asset. Consequently
< d[c(Y ,L)]/dE < 1
Using these properties and returning to the objective function (6)
(6) MAX[V(E)-E] = MAX[c(Y ,L)-E]
E E
The derivative is negative
d[c(Y ,L) - E]
(8) h <°
(except in the limiting case where the probability of ruin is zero).
Since the insurer cannot provide negative equity the value maximizing
choice of E is zero. Notice also that reductions in E imply a wealth
transfer from policyholders to equityholders since
-7-
dH dV(Y ) dc(Y ,L)
(9) —- = - — >K * J dE dE dE /
A similar result has been derived elsewhere using a long term
profit maximization objective (cf. Munch and Smallwood [1981] and
Finsinger and Pauly [1984]). In fact, they also examine possible posi-
tive capital structures by postulating costs to insolvency in the form
of "re-entry" cost. Nevertheless, the case does illustrate the pos-
sibility for wealth expropriation by equityholders , thereby fueling the
argument for leverage regulation in the interests of consumer
protection.
But regulation may also benefit equityholders. An alternative
rationale for solvency regulation has been hinted at somewhat briefly
by Lynch [1981]. Insureds may not be able to monitor the leverage
ratios chosen by individual insurers, but they may well recognize the
incentive for wealth expropriation. Figure 1 shows the utility func-
tion for a representative policyholder having wealth OA. There is a
probability of a total loss of wealth such that the expected value of
uninsured wealth is OB. Without insurance, expected utility is OU .
If a riskless insurance policy were available at premium AC, insurance
would be preferred, as shown by the utility level OU . Insureds cannot
monitor default probabilities but, recognizing incentives for wealth
transfer, presume such costs to be high. The expected loss in value of
the insurance policy due to default is DC (which cannot exceed BA)
.
Consequently the expected utility to the insured from the risky
insurance policy is OU .
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OA = initial wealth
BA = expected loss
of wealth from
insurable perils
AC = premium for in-
surance policy
OU = utility from in-
surance policy if
it is perceived
to be free of
default risk
OU = expected utility
if uninsured
DC = expected loss in
value of insurance
policy due to per-
ceived default risk,
OIL = expected utility
from insurance
policy with per-
ceived default
risk
Figure 1
As drawn, insurance would not be purchased even though the actual
default risk may be lower than indicated. The problem is that
insureds, unable to monitor prospective loss of value in default, will
fear the worst; that all insurer's are "lemons" (cf. Ackerloff [1970];
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1977]). The dynamic effect of such adverse
selection will be a progressive erosion of the demand for insurance.
Existing insurers will be tempted to reduce equity (increase leverage).
Over time, this will lead to more insurance company failures which will
make policyholders even more circumspect about default risk; and so on.
-9-
In such conditions, insurers may well lobby their legislators for
regulatory control to prevent such demand erosion. Two forms of such
regulation will be examined, leverage constraints and insolvency
guarantee schemes. Consider that the insurance firms successfully
lobby for an upper constraint on leverage, or P/E, to be imposed on all
insurers. Insofar as default risk is associated with leverage, this
represents a signal to the market that no "lemons" exist. Of course,
there is some noise in this signal since (a) variations in leverage
are permitted within the constraint and (b) other factors may affect
default probability. Nevertheless, it does provide a signal of
minimum quality to the market which is helpful in maintaining aggregate
demand for insurance policies.
A somewhat stronger quality signal may be sent in the form of a
collective guarantee offered by all insurers to honor outstanding
claims in the event that one of their number default through
insolvency. With such a guarantee scheme, default losses imposed upon
policyholders depend upon the collective strength of the industry
rather than the leverage of the individual insurer. Participation in
such a fund may or may not affect the financial decisions of the
insurer. For example, if the levies to each insurer were related to
the expected value of default loss (e.g., positively related to
leverage) , then any confiscation of policyholder wealth through
increased leverage would, in fact, be passed back to equityholders in
the form of higher assessments in the insolvency guarantee scheme. In
fact, most existing schemes do not work in this way; the schemes are
not prefunded. After an actual insolvency, the remaining insurers are
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assessed for outstanding liabilities in proportion to premium income.
This conveys little or no incentive for leverage control. Thus, the
scheme implies a set of cross subsidiaries between the shareholders of
high default risk and low default risk insurance firms. Given such
subsidies, insurers would wish to eliminate high default risk
insurers from the market. Constraining leverage by regulation provides
3
an appropriate mechanism to limit such cross subsidies.
The rationale for regulation developed here rests upon the absence
of monitoring such that the financial condition of the insurer is not
reflected in its contract prices. Given the nature of insurance markets
it would be somewhat surprising if prices did not impound some informa-
tion on default probabilities. Consumers make extensive use of profes-
sional intermediaries, independent agents and brokers, who make available
price/quality information. Furthermore, the market is serviced by a
rating agency (A. M. Best and Company) that produces ratings of financial
condition, analogous to bond ratings. We now address capital structure
and solvency regulation in the face of complete monitoring information.
IV. CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND SOLVENCY WITH MONITORING
IV. (a) Capital Structure When the Firm is a Price Taker
In the presence of perfect monitoring, the insurance premium P
reflects the value of the insurance portfolio H,. (equation 4) but
includes a markup p = (1-k) for expenses and profit.
(11) P = pH
Q
= [V(Y
L
) - c(Y
1
,L)](l-k)" 1
Expenses X will be assumed to be functionally related to the market
value H
n
. Accordingly if average costs x = X/P equal to k, the firm
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will not earn any excess profit, i.e., it will earn a corapetive
expected rate of return on equity. Such a premium would prevail in a
competitive insurance market. The case of a "price taker" is defined
such that the demand for insurance is perfectly elastic at the exogen-
ously determined k. Such a value may be set either by competitive pro-
cess or by regulation. The latter case permits k to diverge from x.
In examining capital structure, it is noted that leverage depends
both on the choice of output and the choice of surplus. The market
value of liabilities H
n
will be used as the output measure and, as
before, the choice of surplus is E. The firm again maximizes the
increase in its value of equity
(12) MAX[V(E) - E] = MAX[c(Y ,L) - E]
H
Q
E H
Q
E
Substituting (7) into (11) yields
(13) c(Y
1
,L) = E + H [~|]
The first order conditions are
d[c(Y L) - E]
_
(14a) i- = (1-k) l [k - x - H_ i£-] =dH
°
dH
o
d[c(Y L) - E] dH
(14b) —h (1~k) [k - x - Ho% ]-dE - °
Several solutions may be noted.
(a) A long run competitive solution may be attained if k = x and
the firm chooses output at the minimum point on the average
cost curve, dx/dH_ = 0. At this level of output both condi-
tions (lAa)and (14b) are satisfied whatever the level of
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surplus E since the common square bracket is zero. Thus, in
a perfectly competitive market with firms producing at their
least cost level of output, capital structure is irrelevant.
(b) The firm may capture rent (e.g., through regulated prices)
if k > x. In this case, satisfaction of (14a) requires that
the firm produce at an output level reflecting diseconomies
of scale, dx/dH > 0. This may be possible with a "U" shaped
average cost curve. At such an output level, the square
bracket in (14a) may be equated to zero which will also ensure
satisfaction of (14b) whatever the choice of surplus E. In
this case also, the capital structure is irrelevant if the
firm selects its value maximizing level of output.
(c) Now suppose k > x but the firm does not exhibit increasing
returns at any output level, i.e. , dx/dH_
_< for all H .
Conditions (14a) and (14b) cannot be satisfied (except in the
trivial cases where k = 1 or dH /dE = 0). Thus (14a) and (14b)
will both be positive since dH
n
/dE is positive (equation 9).
The optimal output and the optimal surplus both are infinite.
(d) For completeness, it should be added that if k < x, a zero
level of surplus may be optimal. This case is not too
interesting since the required return on equity is insufficient
to maintain capital to the industry and presumably the supply
of insurance services would dry up.
IV. (b) The Choice of Capital Structure When Demand is Price Sensitive
The firm may now choose either price or output since its demand
function is assumed to be downwards sloping. We will further generalize
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the discussion by permitting demand to be sensitive to the choice of
equity. The rational for the latter relationship rests on the default
probability. If an insurance policy is risky in the sense that it
carries a non zero probability of default, it is not efficient in
reducing the dispersion of wealth across states of nature. Consequently,
such a policy would be less attractive to risk averse consumers than a
non risky policy even if both were actuarially priced. Since this
relationship is pertinent to the model developed here it is developed
more formally in the Appendix. To formalize these relationships we
break down output H_ into nominal and valuation factors
(15) HQ
= mL
where L is the face value of the insurance policies, i.e. , the expected
value of claim payments in the absence of default. The term m is the
average present market value of each dollar of promised expected
liability undertaken by the insurer taking account of default risk.
Collecting these pieces together
<"> i >°; i>°; t<°-
We now choose the leverage structure that maximizes the value added
to the equityholders contributed surplus. Given the demand schedule,
L = L(E,k), we can select either output or price as a decision variable.
It is convenient here to choose the latter.
(17) MAX[c(Y E) - E]
k,E
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The first order conditions are
d[c(Y ,E) - E] -
(18a) ± - m( l-k)- 1 [k - x - H
Q f-]f + H {-^~2-} -(1-k)
d[c(Y E) - E] T
(18b)
He
(1"k)
<
m t + L f1 t k " x " Ho% ] " °'
The problem now arises that interior solutions to both (18a) and
(18b) may not be found. For example, the effect of price sensitivity
will be to induce the firm to restrict its output (or equivalently
increase its price), such that the square bracketted term in (18a) is
positive. This follows since dL/dk < 0. But this condition precludes
an interior solution to (18b) which requires the same square bracketted
term to be zero. Thus a possible corner solution to the capital struc-
ture problem arises with the following sequence. First output is
selected by condition (18a). This implies that (18b) will be positive.
Thus the firm selects the maximum possible (theoretically infinite)
level of surplus to complement this output choice. Other possible
solutions may exist; e.g. , by reversing the decision sequence.
The possible capital structure described so far are illustrated in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Possible capital structures with Perfect Monitoring
VALUE ADDED
c(YrL)
- E
solvency constraint
E=0 E |given output
key AA - irrelevance structures may arise for the price
taking firm (a) if k = x and dx/dHg = 0; or
(b) if k > x and dx/dHQ is positive
BB - positive (infinite) leverage may arise (a) for the
price taking firm if dx/dHQ < or (b) for the firm
facing downwards sloping demand.
Given the capital structures illustrated, it would appear that
solvency regulation is irrelevant or redundant to the insurer. With
value line AA, constraints on capital structure cannot affect value
since value is independent of E. With line BB, constraints or leverage
are redundant since the equityholders would rationally choose levels of
surplus in excess of any finite constraint such as E . Nor can we
argue that consumers would have much interest in solvency regulation
since they are able to monitor the financial condition of insurers and
default risk is properly priced. We now turn to the issue of time
inconsistent incentives.
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IV(c). Time Inconsistent Incentives and Wealth Expropriation
Consider the following sequence, (i) the insurer makes a set of
financial decisions [A] relevant to the default probability; (ii) the
insurer then issues policies to customers who may costlessly monitor
[A] ; (iii) the insurer then substitutes a new set of decisions [A'
]
which imply a greater default cost to be borne by the policyholders.
Such time inconsistent incentives have been analyzed for non insurance
firms. For example, the equityholders of a firm may be able to con-
fiscate wealth of bondholders by changing operating decisions or capi-
tal structure after the bonds have been issued (cf. Myers [1977];
Titman [1984]). No doubt bondholders, or in our case policyholders,
will anticipate such pernicious behavior in negotiating their original
contracts. This will be addressed presently. First, we illustrate
possible forms of time inconsistent incentives and show the value that
may be expropriated.
Example 1 Payment of premature dividend to equityholders . Prema-
ture, in this case, means after policies are issued but before policy
liabilities have been discharged by the payment of claims. At the
time of policy issue the value of the equityholders' and policyholders'
claims are shown by the earlier equations;
(4) V(Y
1
) - c(Y
1
,L)
and
(5) c(Y
1
,L)
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Now consider that equityholders pay themselves a dividend, K, imme-
diately before the losses L are known and discharged. The present
value of the policyholders' claim is reduced by
(19) [V(Y
1
)-c(Y
1
,L)] - [V(Y
1
-K)-c(Y
1
-K,L)j
Equityholders' benefit by an equivalent value.
Example 2 An increase in the size of the liability portfolio
without a corresponding increase in surplus . For simplicity we assume
that having issued a set of policies yielding P_ in premiums and
having an expected liability E(L), the insurer now issues another set
of policies having the same expected liability E(L) but now priced at
P . Presumably, the original policies were priced on the assumption
that the leverage ratio was P
n
/E. The new policies are now sold to
new customers who monitor the leverage ratio as (P
n
+P )/E. If all
policies have equal priority then we may identify the loss in value to
the old policyholders as (for simplicity the investment constraint and
expenses are ignored, i.e.
,
c=X=0)
(20) )V[(E+P )(l+r.)] - c[(E+P )(l+r.);L]}
E + P + P E + P + P
- {V[(
jj
-)(l+r
±
)] - c[( \
^)(l+r.);L]}
Since new policyholders are aware of the increased default probabil-
ity, P < P . This implies that old policyholders do indeed lose
wealth and equityholders correspondingly benefit. There is no
expropriation from the new policyholders.
-18-
Example 3 Increase in the risk structure of the insurer's asset
portfolio . The policyholders have a short position in a call option
written on Y with a stochastic, striking price L. Equityholders have
a long position in the same call. Now the value of a rationally
priced call will be positively related to the variance of the
underlying asset (see Merton [1973]). Our example is a little more
complex since the striking price, L, also is stochastic and its corre-
lation with Y. is important (see Stapleton and Subrahmanyan [1984]
,
p. 224). For simplicity, the correlation between Y and L is assumed
to be zero. This ensures the positive relationship between the
variance of Y.. and the value of the call is maintained. Consequently,
an increase in the variance of the asset portfolio will enhance the
value of the equityholders' long position in the call and correspon-
dingly reduce the value of the policyholders' short position. Notice
that the value of the policyholder's claim also depends upon V(Y ).
But if the new, more risky, assets also are priced at equilibrium,
this value will not change with the change in asset composition.
Other examples of such wealth expropriation may be envisioned such
as a change in the reinsurance arrangements selected by the insurer.
IV. (d) Solvency Regulation with Monitoring and Time Inconsistent Incentives
Consider that equityholders expropriate wealth as shown in example 1
in the previous section; i.e. , by paying a dividend K after the issue
of policies but before the payment of claims. The value of wealth
expropriated shown in equation (19) is positive monotonic in K. Thus
equityholders would pay the largest dividend permissible. In the
absence of other regulations, we assume this to be the entire surplus
-19-
E. Thus outstanding insurance policies will run off without any
surplus; E = 0.
Such post contract wealth expropriation would be anticipated by
aware and rational consumers and would be priced into the insurance
contract. Thus the monitoring price would be
(21) P
E=Q
= (V(Yi)e=0
- c(Y 1> L) E=0 ](l-k)-
1
Given that the contract price already impounds the wealth expropriation,
insurers would use this price in determining their initial capital
structure. In fact, the use of such a price does not change the general
characteristics of the output decision (or price decision), (i.e.,
equations (16a) and (18a)) but it does affect the choice of surplus E;
(equations (14b) and (18b)). Since zero surplus is assumed in the pricing
decision, then dP/dE is zero. This is similar to the no monitoring
case (equation 8) and, for identical reasons, the effect is that
d[c(Y E) - E]
(22) <0
which implies a zero precontract choice of surplus, E = 0. There is no
advantage to insurers in providing positive surplus since it will not
change the price paid by consumers for their policies. These contracts
are priced on the assumption of zero surplus and that is what would be
provided by equityholders. There is no longer any incentive to switch
from a pre contract level of surplus to a different post contract
level since the wealth expropriation already has been anticipated.
Now consider the effects on solvency regulation. The possible
capital structures shown in Figure 2 are reproduced in Figure 3. These
-20-
were constructed in the absence of time inconsistent incentives. The
effects of time inconsistent incentives are shown by the dotted lines
AA' and BB' . Also shown is a leverage constraint. Since output is
c
given, a fixed level of E, i.e.
,
E , corresponds to a fixed ratio of
surplus to policy liabilities. Insurers cannot fall below this level,
Figure 3
VALUE ADDED
c(Y
1
,L) - E
^x^B
Y
««^
~^-Y'^ *
^^ ^^
—
"""^ ^s^ «^
•^
^^^ *^^ ^^
«^ — ^.
"~~X'
""** ^ -»•
-A'
"^^
"^*^.
_» 1
n cC i
First we address the case in which choice of surplus was irrelevant
as shown by line AA. The introduction of time inconsistent incentives
leads to the alternative AA' as indicated by inequality (22). Now
zero surplus creates most value for shareholders. However, the wealth
of equityholders has not been diminished since the zero surplus solu-
tion was one of an infinite number of solutions derived on AA that all
yielded the same value added for equityholders. The introduction of
the leverage constraint leaves equityholders no better off or no worse
off as shown by position X. If surplus is increased beyond X,
-21-
the value of equity will fall as shown by the line XX'. This follows
since the condition (22) is negative at any fixed price. Thus produ-
cers would lend to cluster at the constrained leverage ratio, i.e. at
position X.
The second case in Figure 3 arises with line BB. In the absence of
time inconsistent incentives, the level of surplus that maximizes value
added is infinite. But time inconsistent incentives reduce the optimal
surplus to zero as indicated by BB ' . There is a clear wealth loss to
equityholders. Regulation permits some of this wealth loss to be
recaptured by moving surplus to the constraint E . Now, consumers will
anticipate the post contract choice of E surplus and this will be
priced into the contract. Consequently, this level is chosen by
equityholders. This is shown by position Y. Increases in surplus
c
beyond E would not be chosen as value added still is negative in E as
shown by the line YY'.
It is also possible that consumers benefit from such regulation.
The effect of regulation is that consumers are offered policies with a
higher level of surplus and therefore a lower probability of default.
If the demand function is positive in E as indicated, then by reaping
the "consumer surplus" (not to be confused with the insurance surplus
or "paid in" equity) the consumers secure a welfare gain. The high
surplus policies are more efficient at equalizing wealth in states of
nature thus leading to a richer (more complete) market in contingent
claims. The Appendix illustrates that the high surplus/low default
risk policies are more attractive than the low surplus/high default
risk policies; the former being in higher demand.
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IV. (e) Discussion of Multi Period and Related Issues
The use of a single model to illustrate the effects of time incon-
sistent incentives simplifies at the expense of exaggeration. In a
multiperiod setting, there may well be mutual recognition by firms and
consumers, that firm's intending to stay in business will not undertake
post contract expropriations. Thus, for many firms, the expropriations
may not be anticipated in price as indicated. But this may not be true
for all firms and at all times. Property liability insurance exhibits
a distinct cycle in terms of profitability and in terms of entry and
exit of firms from particular markets (see Stewart [1981] and Doherty
and Kang [1984]). Thus, in consumers minds there may be considerable
uncertainty about whether a particular firm will leave the industry or
withdraw from writing a particular line of business. This uncertainty
likely will be heightened during the low ebb of the cycle. In such
circumstances we would expect the contract prices for each firm to
reflect the probability that post contract reductions in surplus may be
undertaken. Such behavior again suggests that insurance contract prices
may be relatively insensitive to the pre contract choice of surplus.
The consequence is that insurers would choose levels of equity that do
not maximize value and that they will benefit from regulation that
bonds them to certain minimum leverage ratios.
In such conditions we can also explain why insurers may not all
cluster at the constrained leverage ratio. Many stronger firms who are
perceived to be unlikely to undertake post contract expropriations may
face upward sloping value curves such as BB in Figure 3. Since the
consumers do not anticipate expropriation it is not priced into the
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contract and the value added line does not pivot down to the BB ' . Con-
sequently these firms would voluntarily choose leverage ratios within
c 5
the contraint (to the right of E ).
Existing controls on portfolio composition may be similarly
rationalized. Such controls aim to reduce the risk of the liability
portfolio. Insofar as this aim is achieved, these controls limit
possible wealth expropriations that may be achieved by switching into a
high risk portfolio strategy.
The third form of control addressed early, solvency guarantee
schemes, also may be rationalized with respect to time inconsistent
incentives. Since the guarantee is given, the policyholders are
indemnified from possible wealth expropriations after contract issue.
However, individual insurers still might expropriate wealth from their
competitors. Any expropriations that might have been targetted at
policyholders are now simply spread over all insurance firms who
collectively assume liability for any outstanding claims in default.
Clearly, all insurers would wish to prevent individual firms from
undertaking such expropriations. Since assessments under the scheme
are not risk related, as discussed earlier, there is a strong incentive
for insurers collectively to prevent cross subsidization by the regula-
tory constraints mentioned, leverage control, and asset composition
control.
CONCLUSION
1) Modigliani and Miller's capital structure irrelevancy proposition
does not necessarily prevail in insurance markets given the strong
-24-
capital market assumptions they propose. This exception arises
from the inseparability of financing and operating decisions. We
identify exceptions to M and M. A necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for irrelevancy is that the firm be a price taker in the
insurance product market.
2) Regulation of leverage and other financial variables may bring
benefit to consumers and equityholders alike in a market in which
financial monitoring does not occur. These results are reformula-
tions of earlier literature.
3) Examples of post contract wealth expropriation arising from time
inconsistent incentives are given. These include premature divi-
dends, expansion of the insurance liability portfolio and restruc-
turing of the firm's reinsurance portfolio.
4) Even in the presence of perfect monitoring regulation may still
bring benefit to equityholders and consumers. The time inconsis-
tent incentives identified lead to inefficient capital structure
decisions. Moreover, consumers will be offered a menu of policies
with high default risk. Regulation permits insurers to recapture
some of the loss in value due to time inconsistent incentives.
Regulation also leads to an available offering of policies with
lower default risk permitting consumers a more complete choice of
risk management options.
5) An ancilliary result is generated in the Appendix. A risk averse
individual will not fully insure if offered an actuarially fair but
risky insurance policy. This result is a further exception to the
Bernoulli principle.
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Footnotes
Using mean variance portfolio analysis, Kahane [1977] has ques-
tioned whether leverage regulation alone is sufficient to constrain
the ruin probability of the insurer.
2
The proof that a call option cannot increase by a value greater
than the increase in value of the underlying asset is as follows. con-
sider the call c(Y,L) and then increase the value Y by some arbitrary
positive K. The call written on c(Y,L) and the call written on
c(Y+K,L) have the following payoffs at maturity.
Payoff in states where:
1. Y < L-K 2. L-K
_< Y < L 3. L < Y
c(Y,L)
c(Y+K,L) Y+K-L
Y-L
Y+K-L
additional payoff on second call Y+K-L < K K
Notice that additional payoffs only arise in the second and third
columns. But the additional payoff in the second column Y+K-L must be
less than K since Y < L. Therefore a payoff of K, or strictly less
than K, arises in all states of nature.
Now consider the increase in value of the underlying asset. The
payoff increases by K (from Y to Y+K) in all states of nature. Con-
sequently, the increase in value of the call option cannot exceed the
increase in the value of the underlying asset in equilibrium.
3Consider the alternative signals, (a) a guarantee scheme with
assessment related to insolvency risk and (b) a scheme without risk
related assessment but with regulatory constraints of the leverage
ratios of insurers. In terms of resource allocation (a) may appear
more efficient since costs are internalized to the decision maker.
However the information required to administer a risk related
assessment scheme is costly. In light of such costs, it is feasible
that combination (b) could be a "first best" solution.
4
Evidence on the performance of the capture theory and competing
theories of price regulation in insurance was recently surveyed by
Harrington [1984].
See Borch [1981] for a discussion of related issues.
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<i
The structure of insurance investment regulations may not be too
effective in limiting portfolio risk. With so many different state
regulations it is difficult to generalize. However, most regulations
address the riskiness of individual securities rather than the risk of
the portfolio. For example, many jurisdictions limit the proportion of
common stock in the insurer's portfolio and preclude such "risky"
assets as options and futures, without reference to hedging possibili-
ties, or to the effect of diversification within a portfolio.
f.
Some related issues are discussed by Borch [1981],
-27-
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Appendix
(a) The Demand for Insurance Is Positively Related to Surplus E
This Appendix is used to illustrate the proposition that the demand
for insurance by risk averse consumers is inversely related to the ruin
probability as postulated in Section IV b. It is assumed that con-
sumers exhibit diminishing marginal utility of wealth and that
insurance prices are actuarially fair both with respect to the expected
value of loss and with respect to the ruin probability. The world is
simplified to the following states of nature defined according to
whether the insured suffers a loss, probability p, and whether the
insurer is solvent, probability q.
insured
insurer No Loss Loss
solvent la 2
insolvent It? 3
probabilities
States 1 (1-p)
2 pq
3 p(l-q)
Total 1.0
It is not necessary to worry further about the subdivision of states 1
since insolvency is irrelevant if the insured does not have a claim.
The loss, L, is assumed to be single valued and positive. We assume
background wealth A to be independent of the loss state (see Doherty
and Schlesinger [1983] for a contrary view). The insured chooses the
level of insurance a that maximizes expected utility; the choice being
the proportion of the loss, L, to be reimbursed in the loss state. The
actuarial premium is equal to the expected loss payment taking account
of default risk;
-A2-
(Al) P = pqL
And the expected utility of wealth for the individual is,
(A2) EU = (l-p)U[A - apqL] + pqU[A - a pqL - L + a L]
+ p(l-q)U[A - apqL - L]
The first order condition to establish a maximum [dEU/da = 0] may be
rearranged to yield
(A3) U* 1-P
1-pq
U
'l
+
P(l-q)
1-pq
U' where U' . is the
marginal utility
of wealth in state i
= ttU^ + (1-tOU'
3
In other words D" is a simple weighted average of U' and U' with
each weight lying between zero and one. Since the loss is non zero,
the wealth in states 1 and 3 may be ordered
w
i > V
This, together with the weighting in equation 3 and the assumption of
diminishing marginal utility, implies
(a) if q = 1
[U'
2
= U^] ^ [w
x
= w
2
] ^ [a = 1]
This is the classic Bernoulli theorem. If a risk averter is
offered an actuarially fair (non risky) insurance policy, he (she)
will fully insure.
-A3-
(b) if < q < 1
[U' < U'
2
< U'
3
] = [Wj > w
2
> w
3
] = [0 < a < 1]
This case is an exception to the Bernoulli theorem which may be
added to other exceptions of heirloom insurance (Cook and Graham
[197ft) and the random initial wealth case (Doherty and Schlesinger
[1983]).
These relationships suggest that the demand for insurance is a negative
function of the default probability (1-q). Using the well known risk
theory relationship that q is a positive function of surplus E, yields
the demand for insurance to be a positive function of E. It is not
claimed that this relationship is universal. It is possible to
construct a counter example by allowing background wealth A in loss
states 2 and 3 to exceed that in state 1 by more than the value of the
loss. But such cases would be highly unusual. Therefore, we use this
example to suggest the plausibility that the demand function is posi-
tive in E.
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